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 Since the early nineties, Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)
1
, with the economic 
liberalisation process, the gradual opening up of their borders and their recent accession in the European 
Union (EU), have emerged as essential players in the international scene. Following the rapid globalisation 
process, characterised by increasing technological progress, new production, organisational and 
management systems and a constantly growing role for competition, the countries of this region are, 
nowadays, well engaged in trade with partner countries and at the same time host significant amounts of 
foreign activities.   
Both trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can potentially enhance economic growth and 
development and therefore the examination of their relationship is of particular importance for the growth 
prospects of CEECs, especially in the context of an expanded EU.  On theoretical grounds, there is a variety 
of approaches that model the FDI and trade relationship.  These span from early theories of FDI, like the 
internationalisation theory and the eclectic paradigm, to general equilibrium trade and new trade theory 
models of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs).  Until now, though, no common ground has been established 
between theoretical explanations coming from an international business or an international economics 
literature perspective. This paper contributes to the above discussion by developing a conceptual framework 
that provides explanations on the FDI Trade relationship focusing primarily on the issue of inward FDI and 
imports in an economy. The issue of whether increased inward FDI causes replacement or expansion of 
imports and vice versa has been examined both theoretically and empirically but continues to remain 
unresolved. It is of particular interest, therefore, to study the above  relationship  in the region.  This paper 
places particular emphasis on two issues: on the issue of the interrelationship between inward FDI and 
imports, i.e. complementarity vs. substitutability and on the location determinants of inward FDI for the ten 
new EU member-states of CEE
2
 and a candidate member state, Croatia. Our empirical exercise builds on 
                                                 
1
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) changed the classification of countries in 2005; the eight former 
countries of CEE that first joined the EU are now classified into the developed ones along with Malta and Cyprus as the 10 new 
member states of the European Union (EU). The rest of the countries including Bulgaria and Romania have been classified in the 
region covering the South-East and the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS). Croatia belongs into this latter region. For analytical 
purposes we refer to these countries as commonly known, i.e. CEECs. 
2 The new EU member states are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the 
recently accessed Bulgaria and Romania. 
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the three-stage least squares (3SLS) technique developed by Zellner and Theil (1962). This technique 
allows us to derive intuitive conclusions on both inward FDI and imports’ driving forces as well as on the 
existing link between the two. 
 According to a survey by Ernst & Young (2010)  CEE is regarded by international executives as 
the third most attractive foreign investment location after Western Europe and China and is the second most  
favoured place for investments in manufacturing industries. The stylized facts regarding FDI inflows into 
the region are a clear manifestation of the region’s importance for international investors.  Although global 
FDI inflows in the turn of the century declined by more than 40% following the global economic 
slowdown, flows into this region grew by 2% in 2001 and as of 2010 these countries were considered by 
international executives as the third most attractive foreign investment locale after Western Europe and 
China and were  the second most favoured place for investments in manufacturing industries.   Further data 
from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) presented in Table 1 show that 
these countries have only been affected by the crisis in 2009 and their levels of inward FDI have picked up 
again in 2010. 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Within this context the present study contributes in five major ways:  
Firstly, we develop a new conceptual approach based on Dunning’s (1981; 1986) Investment 
Development Path (IDP), to study the relationship of inward FDI and imports.  Our argumentation adopts a 
multidisciplinary approach, adds to the existing theoretical explanations and further enhances the active 
mainstream literature on  the role of FDI on trade.  
Secondly, on the grounds of the above theoretical conceptualisation, we develop and operationalise a 
number of empirically testable hypotheses linked to the factors that are more likely to influence imports and 
inward investment decisions in countries that are in transition from centrally planned to market economies.   
Our third key contribution is primarily empirical and is based on the fact that we carry out our 
analysis not only on aggregate inward FDI and imports, as most of the empirical studies up to this point, but 
we further differentiate among the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, i.e. agriculture, 
manufacturing and services.  We theoretically assume and empirically demonstrate that activities in these 
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different sectors will display different behaviour in the various stages of economic development as defined 
by Dunning (1981;1986) in IDP.   
Fourthly, our research focuses on an expanded CEE region (including not only the current EU 
member states but also a candidate country with similar characteristics, i.e. Croatia), for which, to the best 
of our knowledge, this relationship has not been explored, for an extensive time span covering up to the 
most recent year of 2008. To capture differences between countries we use a number of variables capturing 
the different paths towards accession that these countries have followed as well as the different decisions 
made by EU bodies regarding their progress. 
Our final contribution is the enrichment of our empirical analysis with variables capturing not only 
the effect of the overall macroeconomic but also the institutional environment in these particular countries. 
We incorporate variables that capture the overall investment profile of the country, government stability, 
the health of legal framework, corruption in politics and the quality of bureaucracy as well as variables that 
capture socioeconomic distress.  It has been clearly demonstrated in the literature that these variables 
significantly influence international investors’ decisions (Daude and Stein, 2007; Bellos and Subasat, 2012), 
especially in the context of CEECs, and contribute towards understanding how the levels of political and 
economic stability affect inward FDI and imports relationship in transition economies. Very limited studies 
have accounted so far for such factors in the region under consideration, The work of Grosse and Trevino 
(2005) is an exception on these grounds. 
The remainder of this study is organised in the following sections:  The next section investigates the 
relationship between FDI and trade and the FDI determinants through the lens of a thorough literature 
review.  Section 3 conceptualises our framework and leads to the model and hypotheses formulation in 
section 4.  Section 5 presents and discusses the results whilst section 6 concludes the paper offering 
plausible policy recommendations and implications.  
 
 
II. UNDERLYING FRAMEWORK: INWARD FDI – IMPORTS RELATIONSHIP IN CEECs 
 
A country’s development path, as suggested by Dunning (1981;1986) is not independent of its 
inward FDI flows.  MNEs through FDI, transfer new technologies and innovative ways of production thus 
enhancing the growth and the development process of the host economy. This process is further augmented 
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through externalities to local firms and training of the local labour force.  This development process is 
described in Dunning’s IDP (1981) and the underlying eclectic paradigm [Ownership, Location, 
Internalisation framework (OLI)]. In a seminal paper published back in 1981, Dunning explains the 
International Investment Position of countries using “…a Dynamic or Development Approach”.   
In detail, IDP describes five stages of development through which, countries are distinguished by 
their propensity to be outward and/or inward investors. This propensity rests on the extent and pattern of the 
competitive or ownership specific (O) advantages of the indigenous firms relative to those of other 
countries (ownership advantages regard intangible knowledge, managerial or marketing advantages, brand 
names etc); the competitiveness of the location-specific advantages (L) relative to those of other countries; 
and the extent to which indigenous and foreign firms choose to utilise their O advantages jointly with the 
location-specific resources and capabilities of home or foreign countries through internalising (I) the cross-
border market for these advantages rather than by some other organisational route.   
The countries of CEE belonged to the second stage of development for the decade of nineties and 
some of them have only recently moved to the third stage. This means that domestic markets may have 
grown either in size or in purchasing power. Hence, for the time period under examination, the CEECs 
experienced the undertaking of some local production by foreign investors which seemed as a viable and 
profitable alternative to imports. The L advantages of the potential host are decisive, especially for export-
oriented industries, which basically exploit natural resources and primary commodities, creating forward 
vertical structures in their production into labour-intensive low technology and light manufactures (Dunning 
and Narula, 1997; Venables, 1999; Zhang and Markusen, 1999). Simultaneously, the O advantages of 
domestic firms will have increased from the previous stage and will exist due to the development of support 
industries.  Recently, Dunning et al. (2001) further elaborated this discussion by providing a link between 
the IDP and the Trade Development Path (TDP) in their study of Korea and Taiwan. The main point of 
argument posits that the “character composition of both trade and FDI also change as development 
proceeds” and “in stages I and II, both trade and FDI are likely to be between different industrial 
sectors…” (p. 146).  Along the lines of this expanded framework, it is predicted that FDI would take place 
mainly in below average and average (according to their classification) FDI intensity sectors, while imports 
would appear in above average FDI intensity sectors to conclude that “the growth of trade and FDI tends to 
be positively correlated with GNP per capita and with the created asset intensity” (p. 151).  
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  III. MODEL FORMULATION AND UNDERLYING HYPOTHESES 
 
In the previous section we argued that the countries under investigation are classified as stage-two 
countries for the longest period of our time span and some of them  as stage-three countries only lately 
according to the IDP.  During their second stage of the IDP, the CEECs gradually built some desirable L 
characteristics to attract foreign investors. At the same time, the opening-up of borders in the early 90s 
allowed for importing a number of (basically) consumer goods that have previously been excluded from 
those markets. In addition, for countries belonging to the first and second stages, according to Dunning et 
al. (2001), inward FDI and imports
3
 are very likely to be in different sectors. We can distinguish here three 
sources of increased imports for the CEE region.  Two of those sources are related to the stage of the IDP 
and one is specific to the particular region under investigation.  The first two correspond to either imports 
directed to different sectors than FDI or imports of intermediate inputs required in production. The third 
source, which is idiosyncratic to the region, reflects the increased import flows due to the opening-up of 
borders.  
Given the lower production costs in the region, foreign investors are likely to move there those stages 
of production that are resource or labour intensive, i.e. assembling of final goods. In this case, imports of 
intermediate inputs in production would be inevitable.  That would then result in an increasing amount of 
FDI followed by significant import flows aiming at complementing foreign production. 
On the other hand, the increased imports will consequently further boost the FDI attracted in the 
local economy.  As the production base of the country augments and trade liberalises, a greater than before 
number of foreign investors consider the host country as an attractive location and thus invest there.  This 
behaviour acts as the starting point to a virtuous cycle in inward FDI- Imports relationship. 
Following the preceding analysis, two are the major hypotheses (H) to be tested in line with our 
theoretical argumentation. The first hypothesis concerns the relationship between inward FDI and imports 
and is formulated as follows: 
H1:  There is a complementary relationship between inward FDI and imports for the countries of 
CEE under consideration according to their IDP position.  
 
                                                 
3
 Dunning et al (2001) refer in general to FDI and trade, however, elaborating the argument, the relationship refers to either outward 
FDI and exports or to inward FDI and imports which is our case here. 
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The second hypothesis reflects the determinants of inward FDI for countries in the second stage of 
the IDP
4
. This second hypothesis will be broken down to several sub-hypotheses below.  Building again on 
the characteristics of the second stage of the IDP as discussed earlier and on Dunning and Narula (1997) 
and Narula and Dunning (2000), the second hypothesis is formulated as: 
H2: The existence of certain location-specific advantages (S), in the second to third stage of IDP 
countries, will exert a positive influence on inward FDI. 
 On the above grounds, we hereby place particular emphasis on institutional quality as captured by 
a number of utilized variables. Schmieding (1993) states that institutions encompass not only bureaucracies 
and administration but also, more importantly, the entire body of formal laws, rules and regulations as well 
as the informal conventions and patterns of behaviour that constitute the non-budget constraint under which 
economic agents can pursue their own individuals ends. Further to the this,  the quality of institutions 
enables the reduction of information asymmetries, through better information on market conditions, goods 
and participants, which in turn can encourage investment, either domestic or foreign.  
In order to test our hypotheses, the following system of equations is estimated
5
: 












FDIINFLOWS IMPORTS REALGDP PRIMARYEDU
SECONDARYEDU a REALINTEREST a ULC
a R D GDP a INVESTMENTPROF a BUREAUCRACY
a CORRUPTION a GOVERNMENTSTAB a LAW ORDER
a M ASA
   

    
   
   
  
 1
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 2/
it
it it it it
it it it it
LES DUMMIES
IMPORTS FDIINFLOWS REALGDP GDPPERCAPITA
TRADE GDP TRADETAXREV SOCIOCONDITIONS

   
   
 
    
   
 
Where i stands for the country under consideration and t for the respective year.  
The FDI equation
6
 (FDI INFLOWS), where FDI is measured in inflows, is a function of imports 
(IMPORTS).  Though a considerable amount of FDI in the region has taken place through privatisation and 
                                                 
4 We refer to the second stage as the countries under consideration belonged to this stage for the longest period of our analysis. 
5 In the FDI Equation we used alternatively the variables TECHNOLOGY and R&D/GDP but for simplicity we report here only the 
later one. 
6 It must be mentioned here that all of the studies carried out for the CEECs, are country-level, either dealing with total FDI inflows in 
the region or bilateral flows from some advanced origins to CEEC destinations, for there is lack of “consistent and detailed sectoral 
data” (Resmini, 2000, p.666). The only exception belongs to Resmini (2000) who analyses the determinants of FDI inflows in the 
manufacturing sector of twelve host CEECs, following the Pavitt (1984) taxonomy (the Pavitt taxonomy distinguishes among scale-
intensive, high-tech and traditional sectors and specialized producers). 
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acquisitions, the rationale for making such investments still holds regardless of the entry mode
7
. It is worth 
mentioning here that whilst our analysis is based on differentiating between the three sources of imports in 
our empirical analysis, this is not plausible due to data limitations; nevertheless we are able to distinguish 
among imports in agriculture, manufacturing and services.
8
  Based on the existing literature on FDI 
determinants in general but also with regards to the specific region under consideration, we included the 
following explanatory/control variables: for the FDI equation, we included Real Gross Domestic Product 
(REAL GDP) that captures ‘market- seeking behaviour’ as this constitutes a strong characteristic in the 
second stage of IDP and consequently we expect a positive relation
9. The opening up of CEECs’ markets 
was the obvious choice especially for firms whose established markets in the West were saturated (Lankes 
and Venables, 1996; Meyer, 1998; Boeri and Brücker 2000; Bevan and Estrin, 2000; Clausing, 2000; 
Altomonte and Guagliano, 2001; Rojec and Jaklic, 2002).  
H3: Real GDP is expected to have a positive influence on FDI  
The specific factor S, mentioned in H2, is captured by the potential of the local economy in creating 
skills to the labour force.  This is captured by two intensity measures capturing the number of teachers per 
pupils in primary and secondary education (PRIMARY EDU and SECONDARY EDU respectively). 
Dunning (1988) maintains that the skill and education level of labour can influence both the volume of FDI 
inflows and the activities that MNCs engage to in a county. The availability of skills plays a crucial role for 
“the implementation of innovative production technologies and to the adaptation to a Western business 
culture” although “this technology remains less advanced than in the home countries” (Carstensen and 
Toubal, 2004; p. 17 and p. 9 respectively; Rojec and Jaklic, 2002). 
In particular, a high secondary education intensity measure indicates the existence of a skilled labour 
force that can adapt to new production methods in a highly productive way.  In this case a positive sign will 




                                                 
7 The entry modes are distinguished in greenfiled investment, mergers and acquisitions (through privatization), nevertheless, all types 
of entry mode regard long-lasting interest in the respective host, and thus country location factors are significant prerequisites for all. 
8 The use of a different measure of imports, normalized by the total trade, or the GDP of the country does not alter the results. Also the 
inclusion of a lagged FDI and Imports variable in the estimations does not alter the results, which are available upon request from the 
authors. 
9 It is noteworthy that large markets hold also a particular role in new trade and new economic geography theories, as they reflect the 
potential of firms to capture economies of scale (Krugman, 1980, Amiti, 1998). Other studies that traditionally use real gross domestic 
product include Buckley and Casson (1981); Dunning (1993); Aristotelous and Fountas (1996); Clegg (1995); Clegg and Scott-Green 
(1999); and Mold (2003)  
10
 The empirical evidence is vast; a few and influential studies belong to Dasgupta et al. (1996), Narula 1996, Noorbakhsh and Paloni, 
2001).  
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H2a: Primary education intensity is expected to have a positive impact on FDI 
H2b: Secondary education intensity is expected to have a positive impact on FDI 
Labour costs are captured by unit labour cost (ULC) reflecting a more traditional ‘efficiency-seeking 
behaviour’11.  This investment behaviour is closely related to second stage IDP countries where FDI takes 
place primarily for gaining efficiency in production.   Taking into consideration that the dominant investors 
are the more advanced European countries and the US, a negative sign will consent to the location’s 
characteristics expected for a second stage IDP country. Labour costs have been found to exert a significant 
effect on foreign investments in the region, either when examining solely the wages (Holland and Pain, 
1998) or when taking labour productivity into consideration (Bevan and Estrin, 2000; Weiss et al., 2001; 
Egger and Stehrer, 2003)
12
.  
H4: Unit Labour Costs (ULC) are expected to have a negative impact on FDI 
The real interest rate (REAL INTEREST) is included as a measure of risk premium for the economy 
on the grounds that a higher interest rate implies a non-credible and non-stable market on the one hand, and 
a significant cost to investors for raising capital from the local financial market, thus advantaging financial 
capital flows from abroad. Uncertainty with regards to macroeconomic conditions, as well as the 
institutional framework, has been found in the related literature to exert a negative impact on inward FDI 
into the region (Holland and Pain, 1998; Bevan and Estrin, 2000).  More recently, Aizenman and Noy 
(2000) use the interest rate spread and Pantulu and Poon (2003) use the exchange rate as alternative 
measures. 
H5: The real interest rate (REAL INTEREST) is expected to have a negative impact on FDI 
Complementing our second hypothesis we also incorporated two variables capturing the potential of 
the economy to generate new knowledge and innovation.  The first measure captures the Royalty and 
Licence Fees receipts over payments (TECHNOLOGY) as measured in the balance of payments accounts. 
This variable demonstrates the knowledge flows and their particular payments with respect to the host 
economy.  The second measure is the Research & Development expenditure over GDP (R&D OVER GDP) 
and captures the commitment of the host economy to create those conditions that would enable local as well 
as foreign firms to create new knowledge (Neven and Siotis, 1996). The effect of those two variables on 
                                                 
11 Cost factors are at the heart of the Hecksher-Ohlin traditional trade theory.  Foreign investments are considered to be motivated by 
production cost differentials, which investors exploit in order to increase their profits by reducing their cost of production. It is, 
however, beyond the scope of this paper to explain FDI determinants within this framework. 
12 See also Lansbury et al. (1996), Meyer, (1998, 2001) and Hardy (1994). 
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FDI though, especially for countries that are in the second stage of development is ambiguous.  In principle, 
foreign firms are attracted by economies that have the potential to create new knowledge. Contrary, though, 
this variable can capture the building of host firms’ advantages which could result in intense competition or 
even higher labour costs.   
H6: The effect of technology and R&D related variables on FDI can be either positive or negative 
In order to account for the overall macro-environment we also included six variables capturing the 
investment profile, the quality of the bureaucratic system, the existence of corruption in politics, the 
government’s stability, the existence of a cohesive legal framework and the amount of Mergers and 
Acquisitions in the host economy.  The investment profile (INVESTMENT PROF) is a measure of 
expropriation risk, contract viability, the easiness in profit repatriation and the payment delays.  
Bureaucratic Quality (BUREAUCRACY) acts as a supplement to the government’s stability. In countries 
with a good rating, the local bureaucracy can facilitate policies, act in an autonomous way of political 
pressures and offer to the international investors a stable partner irrespectively of the governmental changes. 
Corruption (CORRUPTION) measures the risk of corruption in politics which can indirectly influence the 
cost of entry or operations especially for international investors. Government’s stability (GOVERNMENT 
STAB) is a combined measure of government’s unity, legislative strength of the constitution and popular 
support to the government. It measures the ability of a government to stay in power and carry out its 
policies and programme. This stability is of particular importance to international investors as it gives them 
security over the countries’ policies.  Law and Order (LAW & ORDER) act as a safety net for international 
investors against expropriation risks or any other contractual disagreement and dispute with local partners.  
This variable represents the strength and impartiality of the legal system as well as the popular observance 
of the law.  Finally, Mergers & Acquisitions sales (M&A SALES) measure the overall risk of the economy 
in the sense that they indicate a more liberal and healthy environment as well as the liquidity of the local 
market in the case of disinvestment.  The higher the volume of those the easiest would be for a 




                                                 
13 Some of these variables have been use by other scholars, e.g. Daude and Stein, 2007 (voice and accountability, political stability and 
lack of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption)  Bellos and Subasat, 2012 
(governance, corruption), Jadhav, 2012 (control of corruption, government effectiveness, no violemce) though not for Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
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H6a: We expect a positive influence of the stability of the macro-environment, as captured by the 
different variables (INVESTMENT PROF, BUREAUCRACY, GOVERNMENT STAB, LAW & 
ORDER and M&A SALES) on FDI 
H6b: We expect a negative influence of corruption in politics (CORRUPTION) on FDI 
To adjust for country and time effects we also included the following dummies: for cultural 
proximity of the Baltic States to the Nordic countries we implore a dummy variable, BALTIC as FDI also is 
assumed to differ in the Baltic region firstly due to their geographical distance from the rest of Europe and 
secondly because they receive flows from particular origins due to cultural factors (Brainard, 1997; Meyer, 
1998; Ebbers and Todeva, 1999; Boeri/Brücker et al., 2000; Bevan and Estrin, 2000).  
The method of privatisation followed may act to a greater or lesser extent as a stimulant to foreign 
investors hence a dummy (METH) is included for those states that have followed direct sales to strategic 
owners as a privatisation method according to the EBRD (various issues).  
FDI flows are also considered to be influenced by the reaffirmation of the Madrid European Council 
about EU enlargement in 1995 (Bevan and Estrin, 2000)
14
, thus, we incorporate a time dummy variable 
from 1995 onwards, namely, ENLARG. Finally, another dummy that has been included accounting both for 
country and time specific effects, regards the Agenda 2000 announcement released after the European 
Commission meeting in Amsterdam in 1997. During that meeting, two groups of countries were identified 
according to their transition progress.  It is important, hence, to investigate whether the first wave countries 
received indeed greater amounts of FDI from 1997 onwards (WAVE1). 
The imports equation is basically standard: imports are positively affected by the level of foreign 
investments that take place in line with our theoretical analysis. A set of control variables was also included, 
measuring the market size of the importing country (REAL GDP), GDP per capita (GDP PER CAPITA), the 
trade openness of the local economy as measured by the percentage of imports and exports over the GDP 
(TRADE OVER GDP) and the taxation of imports (TRADE TAX REV).  We expect the first three variables 
to exert a positive influence on imports and the fourth one a negative one.  Particular attention must be paid 
on GDP PER CAPITA because this indicates the respective development level of a country and, 
consequently, its needs for more advanced and qualitative goods produced in Western markets. To further 
                                                 
14 A very interesting from a policy implications’ perspective study, though indirectly linked to CEEC countries, belongs to Breuss et al. 




explore this relationship we included in the analysis a more qualitative variable, which captures the 
socioeconomic conditions in the countries under investigation (SOCIO CONDITIONS).  This variable is a 
composite one and consists of measures of the unemployment rate, the consumers’ confidence and the 
poverty levels in the local economy.  High levels of those three sub-components would indicate a higher 
income inequality and might be the case of social dissatisfaction and distress, significantly affecting imports 




IV. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
V.a The sample 
The sample includes the ten new members of the enlarged EU, i.e. Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the two recently accessed countries, i.e. 
Bulgaria and Romania and a candidate member, i.e. Croatia. The time period covered extends from the 
early transition stages in 1992 till 2008. Our last observation corresponds to year 2008 and reflects the end 
of a period of transition for most CEECs.  By 2008, all CEECs have become EU members and have mostly 
accomplished all the major transition reforms as directed by the EU. In this year, the Czech Republic was 
taken off the list of transition countries and was awarded a status of a developed European economy 
(Schwab, K., and Porter, M. 2008). Furthermore, from the data collection point of view, we have identified 
data availability constraints
16
 after 2008.  Descriptive statistics of our sample for different time periods are 
presented in table 3
17
. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
It is evident from table 2 that there is a substantial increase in FDI inflows to the CEE economies 
from the first time period to the last one.  The mean of FDI inflows shows a fivefold increase from the 
period before 1997 to the period after 2002.  There is a significant improvement in the economic conditions 
of these countries as real GDP and GDP per capita show a steady increase from 1992 to 2008.  This 
increase comes with an improvement in the cost of capital (REAL INTEREST) especially after 2002.  On 
                                                 
15
 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx 
16 Data availability constraints exist after 2008 on institutional data (ICRG, 2008). 
17 The three time periods correspond to the early stages of transition (before 1997), the mature stage (between 1997 and 2002) and a 
stage where most of these countries are beginning their final preparation to the EU accession (after 2002).  To choose among various 
breakpoints in our sample we also employed the Supremum F test, which involves estimating all Chow F statistics for each potential 
breakpoint in the sample and choosing the one where the F statistic was higher. When this test was implemented the breakpoints were 
determined at 1997 and 2002.  The relationships before, between and after these two breakpoints are further explored in the following 
empirical part of the paper. The full correlation of our variables is presented in Appendix 2. 
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the other hand it is evident that the cost of labour, as captured by the unit labour cost (ULC) is increasing 
and it is almost double in the third period compared with the period before 1997. 
The intensity of primary education remains relatively stable over the period whilst the relevant 
measure corresponding to secondary education shows a steady increase.  The two variables capturing the 
R&D intensity of the economy show that while the spending on R&D over GDP remains stable, the 
technology creation in the economy as captured by the Royalties and Fees receipts over payments 
(TECHNOLOGY) shows a constant deterioration from 1992 to 2008.   Finally, the mean of the trade over 
GDP shows a gradual opening of the economies under examination whereas the tax revenues from trade 
remain stable.  This indicates a reduction of the tariffs and other trade related taxation. 
All the variables capturing risk and the institutional environment show a stable improvement with the 
variable capturing the overall investment profile (INVESTMENT PROF) of the country having the most 
significant improvement. The variable capturing the merger and acquisition sales (M&A SALES) in the 
local economy also shows a significant improvement from the first to the last period with an overall fivefold 
increase.  This increase is in line with the increase in FDI inflows in the economies under investigation. 
Data were collected from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Labour Office (ILO), United Nations for Cooperation 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Bank (World Development Indicators) electronic databases, 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW), The International Country Risk Guide, 
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), COMPUSTAT (primarily for the exchange rates) and occasionally 
the Central Banks of the countries under investigation. An analytical description of the incorporated 
variables as well as their sources may be found in Table 3. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
V.b  Econometric techniques  
The present study differs from other relevant articles in the literature testing the inward FDI-imports 
relationship in that we depart from conventional testing of gravity models used elsewhere (Pantulu and 
Poon, 2003; Clausing, 2000) or simple regression tests (Swensson, 2004; Aizenman and Noy, 2005) and 
proceed with Zellner and Theil (1962) 3SLS (Three-stage Least Squares) estimator to get consistent and 
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efficient estimators of the system in order to account for endogeneity.  The 3SLS satisfies the requirements 
for an IV (Instrumental Variable) estimator and therefore is consistent.   
 
V. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
Our first set of results is presented in table 4
18
. At a first stage, the model is estimated without the 
macro-environment or the dummy variables (model 1). At later stages, we include the macro-environment, 
regional and time dummies (models 2 to 9).  
 
Insert Table 4 here
 
 
Overall the results confirm our hypothesis on the complementary relationship between inward FDI 
and imports (i.e. model one). Imports statistically affect FDI inflows and the relationship is quite strong the 
other way round as well.  This strong relationship is supported in the different specifications used later on 
(models two to nine). The coefficient of REAL GDP, capturing ‘market-seeking’ behaviour is also 
significant showing a strong market seeking motivation for investments in the region. 
Our second hypothesis with regards to the availability of the specialized factor S (as approximated by 
PRIMARY EDU and SECONDARY EDU respectively) is also proven to be true. There is though a clear-cut 
difference between the effect of primary and secondary education intensity on FDI. The PRIMARY EDU is 
never significant and generates an ambiguous negative effect. The secondary education (SECONDARY 
EDU) intensity though, which stands for medium workforce capabilities and skills, provides a positive and 
statistically significant sign in almost all regressions (with the exception of model 2).  This result is further 
reinforced by the negative sign of the unit labour cost (ULC) for the FDI equation.  Those two findings 
come in support of the ‘efficiency-seeking’ behaviour of investors in the CEE region.  
In contrast, the sign of R&D OVER GDP is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the 
commitment of an economy towards the creation of new knowledge and innovation rather acts as a 
deterrent to international investors when their motivations are of a traditional nature like the market and 
efficiency seeking.  This variable can also capture the ability of local firms to create competitive advantages 
                                                 
18 Stationarity tests (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 1997) showed no evidence on the existence of a unit root. These results were suppressed 
due to size constraints but are available upon request from the authors. The Im, Pesaran, Shin test were calculated using the IPSHIN 
routine in STATA v.10. 
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and compete with multinationals.  As long as the investment motivations are capturing primarily a 
traditional behaviour, i.e. market or efficiency seeking, this intensity in competition acts as a deterrent to 
entry for international investors.  
The coefficient for REAL INTEREST, although has the hypothesised negative sign, is never 
statistically significant and this complies with results obtained by Aizenman and Noy (2005).   
The variables measuring the institutional stability of the environment have their hypothesised signs 
but only LAW & ORDER is statistically significant in some specifications. This finding reveals that the 
existence of a local market, as measured by REAL GDP and cheap labour force, as captured by ULC, are 
far more important for international investors in a region where the ‘efficiency-seeking’ motivation of FDI 
dominates. 
The final measure of risk included in the model, i.e. M&A SALES has a strong and positive sign 
across the different specifications (models 5 to 9) demonstrating that FDI relies heavily on the ease and 
compatibility of operations in the local economy. 
Results remain consistent with the above when the BALTIC dummy is added to the model (model 6). 
Cultural proximity and ties with Finland and Sweden (Holland and Pain, 1998), for the Baltic countries 
(Estonia and Latvia) do not seem to affect positively their capability in attracting foreign investment. 
Contrary, the reliance on rather peripheral international investors reduces the amount of FDI INFLOWS in 
the host economy.  The speed of privatization (METH) on the other hand has a positive impact for those 
countries that have shown better performance in this respect (model 7). Both variables capturing the process 
of integration in the EU are insignificant. Contrary to our expectations, ENLARG produces a positive but 
insignificant result (model 8). The variable has the hypothesised positive sign but remains insignificant.  
This result, with respect to the positive sign of ENLARG, conforms to Breuss at al. (2001) and Bevan and 
Estrin (2000) for the role of announcements in inward FDI in the region. Finally, WAVE1 dummy, 
stemming from Agenda 2000 announcement, does not indicate significantly higher inflows both for specific 
countries, i.e., Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic, and for the years 1997-
2000 (model 9).   
At the same time, in the imports equation, both REAL GDP and GDP PER CAPITA give very strong 
positive signs. The effect of REAL GDP is straightforward while the per capita income (GDP PER 
CAPITA) may be perceived as having demand-side and supply-side influences and the way it affects 
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imports may alter as it changes. On one hand, taken as a measure of consumer taste, it indicates the 
appropriateness of foreign production for host country markets, whilst on the supply-side GDP per capita 
“may well be related to the technological and managerial capability of the host country” (Papanastassiou 
and Pearce, 1991). Rising GDP PER CAPITA is expected to affect imports positively on the grounds that 
consumers desire more advanced and qualitative products produced elsewhere in the world, which local 
industrial structures cannot support (Linder effect, Linder 1961). The trade variable, i.e. openness of the 
local economy is insignificant in all specifications.  Contrary, taxation on international trade turns out to be 
negative and significant.  This indicates that trade barriers overall have negative and significant effects.  
Finally, the socioeconomic conditions do have a positive effect but an insignificant one. 
In order to gain further insights on the FDI-Imports relationship and the effect on each other we 
decided to break down our sample into three different periods.  The first, early years of transition (before 
1997), the main transition phase (between 1997 and 2002) and the final steps of preparation for EU 
accession (after 2002).  The results are reported in Table 5. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
In the first period, imports affect FDI in a positive and statistically significant way whilst FDI 
shows no impact on imports.  It is the beginning of an imports induced FDI cycle as described by the IDP.  
This conforms to Dunning’s rationale (1981) that in the early stages FDI will be of the form of import 
substituting investment.  This reveals that companies prefer to service the markets primarily through exports 
and whenever possible complement those with FDI.   In the second period the opposite relationship holds 
with FDI affecting imports in a positive and statistically significant way, whilst imports do not affect in a 
statistically significant way FDI.  This shows that gradually an FDI basis, from the previous period, was 
built and now imports complement FDI especially in the form of intermediate goods. This can be 
interpreted as FDI driven imports, which corresponds to Helpman’s (1984) hypothesis on capital and 
services’ flows from the headquarters to the plants (vertical FDI). During the final period the CEE countries 
have entered the hypothesised virtuous cycle of FDI-Imports attraction discussed in the previous sections. 
This argument is further reinforced by the signs and statistical significance of other variables in the 
estimations of table 5.  The existence of SECONDARY EDU plays a significant role only in the early 
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stages of transition and the later stage of preparation to the EU accession, whilst R&D OVER GDP acts as a 
deterrent only in the first and second period.  For the main period of transition between 1997 and 2002 four 
variables affect FDI INFLOWS.  The cost of labour as captured by ULC, GOVERNMENT STAB that 
shows the determination of governments to push forward the transition process, LAW & ORDER as 
capturing the improvement of the overall legal environment and of course the M&A SALES as a potential 
entry method for international investors. This differentiation in behaviour among the periods is in line with 
Bergsten et al. (1978), Pearce (1982) and Svensson, (1996) who evidence that the relationship varies over 
time. 
Overall, our results conform to the majority of the existing empirical literature on FDI-Trade 
relationship which points to a complementary relationship. It is supportive of our theoretical argumentation 
of this relationship for countries belonging to the second stage (stepping to the third stage) of IDP, giving 
credit to Dunning’s IDP framework (2001). Combining the results, it is evident that FDI is directed to 
Central and Eastern Europe mainly to take advantage of the new markets and exploit the cheap labour cost 
The availability of a skilled but cheap labour force and the levels of the domestic income seem to have 
influenced to a great extent inward foreign investment in the region, which is actually expected. The 
growing attractiveness of the region is gradually reinforced by the improvement of the macroeconomic 
environment. 
We have also estimated the results presented in Table 5 with the inclusion of dummies (BALTIC, 
METH, ENLARG, WAVE1). Results for the models remain overall the same
19
 and the following 
observations can be made for the different dummies used. The BALTIC dummy becomes insignificant for 
the period before 1997 but keeps its negative and significant sign for the two periods after 1997. Both 
countries before 1997 are at the early stages of their transition process and thus the amount of FDI flows is 
rather small. The METH dummy is positive only in the prior to 1997 period. This is the period of major 
privatizations and this is reflected in the statistical significance of this dummy which keeps its positive sign 
but becomes insignificant after 1997. The ENLARG dummy was not significant in our overall model 
presented in Table 4 but now becomes significant for the period before 1997 and the period between 1997 
and 2002. For the first period the dummy is negative and significant indicating increased levels of risk for 
the European integration process that lead to reduced FDI inflows but becomes positive and significant for 
                                                 
19
 Results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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the period between 1997 and 2002 after the reaffirmation of the Madrid European Council decision on EU 
enlargement.  This increases the stability in the region, reduces uncertainty and attracts increased FDI 
flows. Finally our WAVE1 dummy remains negative but with significance only after the 1997 periods. This 
could capture the increased competition in these countries that could act as deterrent to increased FDI flows. 
A final step towards understanding the FDI-Imports relationship was to break up FDI and imports 
into different industrial sectors.  This would fully complement our analysis on the three different channels 
of imports and their effect on FDI.  This analysis would also provide some further insights on the transition 
of those countries from stage 1 to stages 2 and 3 of the IDP.  The results on the different sectors are 
presented in table 6.  We decided to present here the effect of imports in agriculture, manufacturing and 
services on the total FDI and the effect of FDI in agriculture, manufacturing and services on the total 
imports.  The results from the individual effects do not alter the picture. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
This set of results further supports our previous argumentations and hypotheses.  During the first 
period we have a strong complimentary relationship between all types of imports and FDI whilst FDI 
complements imports only in agricultural activities.  FDI in services during this same period substitutes 
imports whilst FDI in manufacturing activities does not show any kind of statistically significant 
relationship with imports.  In the second period, imports both in agriculture and manufacturing are 
substituting FDI whilst complement FDI in services.  In the imports equation, it is evident that FDI now 
complements imports in both agriculture and manufacturing.  Finally, in the third period, in the imports 
equation results remain similar to the previous period with the exception of FDI in agriculture which shows 
now no significant impact on imports, whilst imports are still primarily driven by FDI in agriculture and 
manufacturing.  These results reveal a change in the structure of the economies under examination similar 
to the one hypothesised by the IDP and conform to Dunning et al. (2001) who argue that for countries 
belonging to the first and second stages, FDI and trade are very likely to be in different sectors. 
Similarly to Table 5 we have also estimated results of Table 6 with the inclusion of dummies. Results 
for the models remain overall the same
20
 and the following observations can be made for the dummies used. 
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 Results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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The dummy BALTIC keeps its negative and significant sign. The dummy METH changes sign and remains 
statistically significant. The dummy has now a negative sign indicating that once controlling for sectors the 
privatisation methods with direct sales to strategic investors is perceived as an obstacle for a lot of foreign 
investors. This could be the result on monopolistic powers emerging in the markets and thus reduced 
opportunities for market expansion. The ENLARG dummy remains insignificant whilst the WAVE1 
dummy remains negative but gains significance. This follows the argument raised above, when discussing 
the different time periods, on the increased competition. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper addresses this imperative need to understand international investors’ behaviour as well as 
the relationship between inward FDI and imports.  The paper uses the most expanded data span in the 
current literature, from the early stages of transition to nowadays and an enriched dataset of countries and 
location factors. 
In regards to the inward FDI vs. imports relationship, results strongly indicate an overall 
complementarity when examining FDI inflows. Our results show the gradual transition from an Imports 
induced FDI-Imports cycle to an FDI one and finally towards the latest stages of development (after 2002) 
to a virtuous FDI-Imports succession. 
Another important issue that could be further highlighted is the ‘core-periphery’ issue within an 
enlarged EU.  The effect of EU enlargement seems to act in a positive way for the FDI attraction potentials 
of those countries.  FDI in these countries almost tripled in the period after the announcement of EU 
enlargement.  It is too soon to address, however, this issue in depth due to the recent adhesion date of these 
countries.  This study though offers a holistic framework of research, applicable to other cases as well.  
Further examination of the inward FDI-Imports relationship and the determinants of inward FDI in the 
region may be of concern to other countries’ policy makers, both within the EU and those of other emerging 
economies.  The discussion of further EU enlargement towards the East with the accession of Turkey and 
other Commonwealth member states (CIS) has already started.   
In what regards the first, it would be interesting in the ways that this new reality in the CEEC region 
might affect both developed and the peripheral countries like Greece and Portugal. Regarding the emerging 
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economies, it would be of interest to check the relative trends between the regions and countries as they also 
receive increasing interest from foreign investors. 
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Table 1. Inward and Outward FDI in selected CEECs (as percentage of GDP) 
 














Bulgaria 1.46 19.02 -0.24 6.88 0.50 4.53 
Croatia 2.05 8.91 1.96 4.62 -0.33 0.96 
Czech Republic 2.00 2.99 0.50 1.54 0.89 3.53 
Estonia 4.73 7.35 8.04 9.54 0.69 8.02 
Hungary 2.00 4.75 2.10 1.59 1.19 1.84 
Latvia 0.72 3.75 -0.24 0.36 0.07 1.46 
Lithuania 0.71 4.32 0.59 0.47 0.35 1.73 
Poland 0.83 2.80 1.21 3.18 1.00 2.07 
Romania 0.14 6.81 -0.05 3.01 0.12 2.24 
Slovakia 0.56 4.96 0.49 -0.06 0.38 0.60 
Slovenia 2.54 3.56 0.34 -1.18 0.32 1.75 
Grand Total 1.41 6.42 1.19 3.21 0.58 3.22 




Table 2. Summary statistics of variables 
 Before 1997 Between 1997 & 2002 After 2002 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
FDI Variables INWARD FLOWS* 55 837.18 1331.51 10.00 5103.49 66 1924.85 2213.24 106.60 9343.00 66 3701.98 3569.91 179.18 13922.00 
AGRICULTURE* 55 7.94 14.37 10.00 78.83 66 17.41 41.83 106.60 177.92 66 58.64 126.11 179.18 604.63 
MANUFACTURING* 55 383.83 667.50 15.67 3601.16 66 756.95 1163.05 108.56 4787.89 66 1746.34 1304.94 206.76 3962.42 
SERVICES* 55 340.94 595.53 18.76 3372.28 66 1078.87 1729.62 197.32 8432.47 66 1897.74 1603.65 205.33 6895.38 
IMPORT Variables IMPORTS* 55 11878.26 9482.26 1548.54 44460.20 66 19061.25 16634.97 3432.33 65550.85 66 40864.09 34473.87 6307.17 145033.50 
AGRICULTURE* 55 259.09 216.27 11.89 982.20 66 311.19 267.73 49.92 1065.95 66 624.43 539.17 143.78 2528.71 
MANUFACTURING* 55 9632.98 7621.29 1240.00 37135.00 66 16015.17 14112.97 2720.00 55298.91 66 35228.76 29854.91 5234.09 124177.80 
SERVICES* 55 1986.19 1819.01 156.41 7138.00 66 2734.89 2307.88 662.41 9186.00 66 5010.91 4313.02 929.30 18327.00 
Economic Variables REAL GDP** 55 86.88 89.39 10.70 363.35 66 104.27 115.23 12.97 457.01 66 127.83 136.61 18.78 550.12 
GDP PER CAPITA 55 7397.75 2425.17 4514.40 13421.20 66 9991.89 3255.17 5122.90 18872.80 66 14313.65 4129.09 7271.50 24930.00 
REAL INTEREST 55 6.39 2.70 1.17 12.67 66 6.38 2.57 3.14 21.37 66 4.82 1.01 3.18 7.03 
ULC 55 51.65 16.81 6.66 84.82 66 64.33 11.44 39.63 88.95 66 95.93 10.93 66.73 117.60 
Competitiveness and 
Human Capital Variables 
PRIMARY EDU 55 6.32% 1.64% 4.50% 10.07% 66 6.61% 1.46% 5.00% 9.73% 66 7.06% 1.41% 5.44% 10.43% 
SECONDARY EDU 55 8.85% 1.48% 6.01% 11.93% 66 8.72% 0.87% 7.19% 10.25% 66 11.49% 9.56% 6.67% 44.18% 
R&D OVER GDP 55 0.74% 0.32% 0.31% 1.44% 66 0.78% 0.33% 0.37% 1.56% 66 0.81% 0.38% 0.28% 1.61% 
TECHNOLOGY 55 1.98 9.16 -0.28 66.50 66 0.34 0.35 0.00 1.70 66 0.27 0.21 0.03 0.76 
TRADE OVER GDP 55 23% 13% 4% 58% 66 33% 13% 13% 61% 66 57% 21% 25% 95% 
TRADE TAX REV 55 34.68% 8.86% 14.27% 54.74% 66 36.10% 5.78% 25.54% 48.41% 66 36.20% 5.47% 26.35% 49.37% 
Institutional and Risk 
Variables 
INVESTMENT PRO 55 7.05 2.34 3 10 66 9.24 1.31 7 12 66 9.54 1.66 6 12 
BUREAUCRACY 55 2.60 0.65 1 4 66 2.64 0.74 1 4 66 2.65 0.67 1 4 
CORRUPTION 55 3.81 0.86 2 5 66 3.39 0.85 2 5 66 3.02 0.68 2 4 
GOVERNMENT ST 55 7.52 1.69 5 10 66 9.09 0.98 7 11 66 8.01 1.17 5 11 
LAW & ORDER 55 4.96 0.65 4 6 66 4.57 0.58 4 6 66 4.49 0.46 4 5 
SOCIO CONDIT 55 5.56 0.81 4 8 66 5.12 1.55 1.33 7.50 66 5.72 1.08 4 8 
M&A SALES* 55 240.00 512.06 0.00 2333.40 66 900.53 1496.39 0.00 9316.00 66 1291.05 1971.47 0.00 11160.15 
* Million US $, ** Billion US $ 
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Table 3. Variables Description 
 
Variable Description Source 
FDI INFLOWS Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, (Total, Constant 1995 International US $ mil) The Vienna Institute for International 
Economic Studies, WIIW Database and 
UNCTAD 
FDI AGRIC Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Agriculture, (Total, Constant 1995 
International US $ mil) 
The Vienna Institute for International 
Economic Studies, WIIW Database 
FDI MANUF Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Manufacturing, (Total, Constant 1995 
International US $ mil) 
The Vienna Institute for International 
Economic Studies, WIIW Database 
FDI SERVICES Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Services, (Total, Constant 1995 International 
US $ mil) 
The Vienna Institute for International 
Economic Studies, WIIW Database 
IMPORTS Imports of goods and services, (BoP, Constant 1995 International US $ mil) World Development Indicators, World Bank 
and  European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
IMPORTS AGRIC Imports of agricultural goods, (BoP, Constant 1995 International US $ mil) World Development Indicators, World Bank 
and  European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
IMPORTS MANUF Imports of manufacturing goods, (BoP, Constant 1995 International US $ mil) World Development Indicators, World Bank 




Imports of  services, (BoP, Constant 1995 International US $ mil) World Development Indicators, World Bank 
and  European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
REAL GDP GDP, PPP (Constant 1995 International US $ bn) Economist Intelligence Unit, COMPUSTAT 
and Authors’ Calculations 
PRIMARY EDU Number of Teachers over Number of Pupils enrolled in Primary education World Development Indicators, World Bank 
and Authors’ Calculations 
SECONDARY EDU Number of Teachers over Number of Pupils enrolled in Secondary education World Development Indicators, World Bank 
and Authors’ Calculations 
REAL INTEREST Real interest rate (%) World Development Indicators, World Bank 
and International Financial Statistics 
ULC Unit Labour Cost Index (US $, 2005=100) Economist Intelligence Unit and International 
Labour Office 
TECHNOLOGY Royalty and Licence Fees Receipts over Payments  (BoP, Constant 1995 
International US $) 
World Development Indicators, World Bank 
and Authors’ Calculations 
R&D OVER GDP Research and Development Expenditure over GDP World Development Indicators, World Bank 
and Authors’ Calculations 
INVESTMENT 
PROFILE 
Investment Profile (Contract viability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation, Payment 
Delays).  Takes values from 0 to 12 with higher values corresponding to a very low 
risk in the different categories) 
International Country Risk Guide Database 
BUREAUCRACY Bureaucratic Quality.  Takes values from 0 to 4 with higher values corresponding to 
a better bureaucratic quality of the governmental system. 
International Country Risk Guide Database 
CORRUPTION Corruption. Takes values from 0 to 6 with higher values corresponding to higher 
corruption within the political system. 
International Country Risk Guide Database 
GOVERNMENT 
STAB 
Government Stability (Government Unity, Legislative Strength, Popular Support).  
Takes values from 0 to 12 with higher values corresponding to higher government 
stability. 
International Country Risk Guide Database 
LAW & ORDER Law and Order (Judicial system, Crime rate).  Takes values from 0 to 6 with higher 
values corresponding to better judicial systems and lower criminal rates. 
International Country Risk Guide Database 
M&A SALES Merger & Acquisition Sales in the host economy. (Total, Constant 1995 
International US $ mil) 
UNCTAD, COMPUSTAT and Authors’ 
Calculations 
BALTIC Dummy=1 if country is Estonia and Latvia (Lithuania, though a Baltic country, is 
excluded due to its poor relationship with Russia) 
Authors’ Dummy 
METH Dummy=1 if country is Estonia and Hungary – following direct sales to strategic 
owners as a privatization method 
Authors’ Dummy from European Banks for 
Reconstruction and Development 
ENLARG Dummy=1 if year>=1995 onwards - reaffirmation of the Madrid European Council 
about EU’s enlargement 
Authors’ Dummy 
WAVE1 Dummy=1 if country is Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia  & 
year >=1997 – Agenda 2000 announcement identifying two groups of countries 
(wave1 and wave2 countries) 
Authors’ Dummy from European Banks for 
Reconstruction and Development 
GDP PER CAPITA GDP per capita, PPP (Constant 1995 International US $) World Development Indicators, World Bank 
TRADE OVER GDP Trade (% of GDP) World Development Indicators, World Bank 
and European bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
TRADE TAX REV Taxes on International Trade (% of current revenue) World Development Indicators, World Bank 
SOCIO 
CONDITIONS 
Socioeconomic Conditions (Unemployment, Consumer Confidence, Poverty).   
Takes values from 0 to 12 with higher values corresponding to better social 
conditions. 
International Country Risk Guide Database 
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Table 4.  Model estimation, 3SLS, Endogenous Variables: FDI INFLOWS and IMPORTS 
 one two three four five six seven eight nine 
FDI INFLOWS          
IMPORTS 0.753*** 0.760*** 1.162*** 1.150*** 0.929*** 0.956*** 0.929*** 0.894*** 0.972*** 
 (0.132) (0.137) (0.143) (0.156) (0.157) (0.139) (0.153) (0.168) (0.152) 
REAL GDP 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PRIMARY EDUC -0.296 -0.698 2.849 -4.184 -0.693 -1.184 -6.619 -0.505 -0.490 
 (5.031) (4.987) (4.470) (5.410) (5.107) (4.820) (5.502) (5.151) (5.100) 
SECONDARY EDUC 2.181* 2.037 2.761** 2.836** 2.894*** 3.286*** 1.934* 2.648** 3.065*** 
 (1.250) (1.242) (1.102) (1.099) (1.037) (1.070) (1.062) (1.046) (1.080) 
REAL INTEREST -0.026 -0.026 -0.006 -0.012 -0.018 -0.006 -0.037 -0.018 -0.012 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
ULC -0.003** -0.003** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.006*** -0.003** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
TECHNOLOGY  -0.001        
  (0.012)        
R&D OVER GDP   -1.045*** -1.195*** -1.189*** -1.292*** -1.031*** -1.136*** -1.098*** 
   (0.210) (0.225) (0.210) (0.197) (0.221) (0.219) (0.232) 
INVESTMENT PROF    0.050 0.063 0.067 0.061 0.054 0.076 
    (0.052) (0.050) (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) (0.052) 
BUREAUCRACY    0.132 0.116 0.118 0.052 0.117 0.112 
    (0.130) (0.122) (0.113) (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) 
CORRUPTION    -0.047 -0.053 -0.043 -0.036 -0.061 -0.080 
    (0.097) (0.091) (0.084) (0.097) (0.091) (0.095) 
GOVERNMENT 
STAB    0.052 0.041 0.030 0.043 0.058 0.036 
    (0.055) (0.051) (0.046) (0.050) (0.055) (0.051) 
LAW & ORDER    0.143 0.171 0.184* 0.240** 0.166 0.154 
    (0.124) (0.116) (0.110) (0.119) (0.116) (0.116) 
M&A SALES     0.020*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 
     (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
BALTIC      -0.527***    
      (0.202)    
METH       0.480**   
       (0.224)   
ENLARGEMENT        0.191  
        (0.257)  
WAVE1         -0.172 
         (0.193) 
CONSTANT -0.471 -0.480 -3.643*** -4.072** -2.662* -2.907** -2.124 -2.335 -3.303** 
 (1.260) (1.301) (1.252) (1.614) (1.575) (1.337) (1.589) (1.634) (1.622) 
LIMPORTS          
LFDI INFLOWS 0.330** 0.348** 0.168* 0.228*** 0.203*** 0.353*** 0.241*** 0.227*** 0.222*** 
 (0.138) (0.137) (0.097) (0.073) (0.057) (0.050) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) 
REAL GDP 0.003*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP PER CAPITA 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.0013*** 0.012*** 0.0014*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
TRADE OVER GDP -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TRADE TAX REV -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
SOCIO CONDITIONS    0.043 0.038 0.019 0.035 0.035 0.037 
    (0.031) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
CONSTANT 6.587*** 6.501*** 7.421*** 7.253*** 7.410*** 6.420*** 7.193*** 7.274*** 7.294*** 
 (0.711) (0.708) (0.539) (0.498) (0.423) (0.376) (0.400) (0.414) (0.413) 
          
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
F Equation 1 36.97*** 30.96*** 46.22*** 30.46*** 36.64*** 36.72*** 35.60*** 34.18*** 34.69*** 
F Equation 2 199.02*** 194.72*** 178.88*** 161.82*** 160.12*** 170.96*** 166.86*** 164.90*** 163.80*** 
Akaike Info Criterion 419.677 411.928 416.378 396.669 391.870 330.733 377.772 389.059 384.795 
Hansen/Sargan 3.59 3.88 2.70 4.84 4.53 8.39 5.01 5.21 4.92 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** Significant at 1%,  ** Significant at 5%,  *Significant at 10%
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Table 5.  Model estimation, 3SLS, Endogenous Variables: FDI INFLOWS and IMPORTS, 
Different Time Periods of Transition 
 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** Significant at 1%,  ** Significant at 5%,  *Significant at 10%
 Before 1997 Between 1997 and 2002 After 2002 
FDI INFLOWS    
IMPORTS 1.445*** 0.502 1.138*** 
 (0.402) (0.325) (0.350) 
REAL GDP -0.003 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
PRIMARY EDUC -3.137 -2.634 -27.709*** 
 (10.500) (7.030) (7.477) 
SECONDARY EDUC 25.940** -0.397 37.645*** 
 (11.965) (1.141) (9.670) 
REAL INTEREST -0.023 -0.067 -0.120 
 (0.032) (0.054) (0.096) 
ULC -0.010*** -0.014** -0.015** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) 
R&D OVER GDP -2.033*** 0.187 -0.628** 
 (0.563) (0.260) (0.262) 
INVESTMENT PROF 0.027 0.141 0.050 
 (0.124) (0.094) (0.060) 
BUREAUCRACY -0.150 -0.093 -0.129 
 (0.221) (0.187) (0.166) 
CORRUPTION 0.078 0.039 -0.099 
 (0.206) (0.266) (0.123) 
GOVERNMENT STAB 0.186 0.269*** 0.103 
 (0.123) (0.077) (0.107) 
LAW & ORDER 0.002 0.314** 0.083 
 (0.216) (0.012) (0.153) 
M&A SALES 0.026 0.025*** 0.022** 
 (0.022) (0.008) (0.007) 
CONSTANT -9.446*** 7.397* -3.106 
 (3.230) (3.754) (2.857) 
IMPORTS    
FDI INFLOWS 0.062 0.431*** 0.397*** 
 (0.057) (0.085) (0.056) 
REAL GDP 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP PER CAPITA 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TRADE OVER GDP -0.006** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
TRADE TAX REV -0.014* -0.007 -0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
SOCIO CONDITIONS 0.073 0.022 0.044 
 (0.054) (0.057) (0.029) 
CONSTANT 8.211*** 5.677*** 6.560*** 
 (0.520) (0.826) (0.455) 
    
N 55 66 66 
F Equation 1 27.05*** 20.10*** 20.88*** 
F Equation 2 116.58*** 50.87*** 61.28*** 
Akaike Info Criterion 113.830 122.850 58.262 
Hansen/Sargan 3.79 3.96 4.08 
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Table 6.  Model estimation, 3SLS, Endogenous Variables: FDI INFLOWS and IMPORTS, 
Different Time Periods of Transition & Different Industrial Sectors 
 Total Before 1997 
Between 1997 and 
2002 After 2002 
FDI INFLOWS     
IMP AGRIC -0.191 1.186** -1.357*** 0.025 
 (0.270) (0.557) (0.326) (0.284) 
IMP MANUF 3.265*** 5.388*** -2.027** -4.151** 
 (0.940) (1.697) (0.984) (1.752) 
IMP SERVICES 1.250*** 0.971*** 0.556** 1.354*** 
 (0.166) (0.331) (0.218) (0.202) 
REAL GDP 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
PRIMARY EDUC -6.143 4.400 -6.908 -16.390*** 
 (5.421) (10.607) (7.875) (5.299) 
SECONDARY EDUC 2.468** 19.792* 34.665*** 4.341*** 
 (1.079) (10.191) (9.063) (0.909) 
REAL INTEREST -0.004 -0.036 -0.071 -0.074* 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.091) (0.042) 
ULC -0.007* -0.012* -0.007*** -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) 
R&D OVER GDP -1.380*** -2.147*** -0.078 -1.408*** 
 (0.289) (0.735) (0.287) (0.278) 
INVESTMENT PROF 0.009 0.457*** 0.128*** 0.011 
 (0.048) (0.153) (0.045) (0.090) 
BUREAUCRACY 0.257 0.047 0.049 0.785*** 
 (0.204) (0.308) (0.215) (0.242) 
CORRUPTION -0.110 -0.495** -0.283*** -0.133 
 (0.101) (0.202) (0.100) (0.200) 
GOVERNMENT STAB 0.088 0.419*** 0.230*** 0.181*** 
 (0.055) (0.146) (0.084) (0.061) 
LAW & ORDER 0.106 0.461* 0.127 0.144 
 (0.129) (0.245) (0.125) (0.207) 
M&A SALES 0.023*** 0.022* 0.022 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.019) (0.007) 
CONSTANT -30.888*** -34.024*** 2.915 -3.578 
 (4.708) (7.688) (5.620) (6.857) 
IMPORTS     
FDI AGRIC 0.116*** 0.188*** 0.078** 0.127*** 
 (0.027) (0.053) (0.037) (0.041) 
FDI MANUF 0.211*** 0.031 0.192*** 0.255*** 
 (0.043) (0.099) (0.044) (0.069) 
FDI SERVICES -0.122** -0.238** -0.081*** -0.134** 
 (0.053) (0.087) (0.031) (0.006) 
REAL GDP 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP PER CAPITA 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
TRADE OVER GDP -0.001 -0.006* 0.003* 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
TRADE TAX REV -0.012** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.013) 
SOCIO CONDITIONS 0.043 0.095 0.072** 0.052 
 (0.028) (0.057) (0.030) (0.060) 
CONSTANT 7.540*** 9.120*** 6.826*** 6.586*** 
 (0.440) (0.687) (0.599) (1.129) 
     
N 187 55 66 66 
F Equation 1 39.60*** 37.55*** 53.74*** 38.13*** 
F Equation 2 118.80*** 36.13*** 119.02*** 38.45*** 
Akaike Info Criterion 224.297 55.935 14.683 59.101 
Hansen/Sargan 11.01 4.14 3.44 3.80 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** Significant at 1%,  ** Significant at 5%,  *Significant at 10%
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Appendix. Correlation Table 
 
lfdiin limp lfdiagric lfdimanuf lfdiserv limpagric limpmanuf limpserv rgdpppp primar_int~s secon_intens reffintr ulc rdgdp invprof burqua corruption gov_stab lao masales gdppcppp tradegdp taxtrade soccon 
lfdiin 1 
                       
limp 0.8314* 1 
                      
lfdiagric 0.6999* 0.5212* 1 
                     
lfdimanuf 0.8155* 0.7771* 0.6366* 1 
                    
lfdiserv 0.8123* 0.6677* 0.7482* 0.8074* 1 
                   
limpagric -0.4255* -0.3510* -0.5014* -0.3494* -0.2936* 1 
                  
limpmanuf 0.5602* 0.5686* 0.4047* 0.5932* 0.5487* -0.2675* 1 
                 
limpserv 0.8068* 0.9522* 0.5432* 0.7674* 0.6705* -0.3591* 0.5332* 1 
                
rgdpppp 0.6070* 0.7028* 0.3784* 0.5661* 0.5390* -0.1968* 0.2851* 0.7148* 1 
               
primar_int~s 0.4066* 0.4127* 0.1485 0.3856* 0.3732* 0.1601* 0.3504* 0.4248* 0.4339* 1 
              
secon_intens 0.094 -0.035 0.115 0.0116 0.1112 0.1968* 0.0864 -0.0113 -0.1214 0.2478* 1 
             
reffintr -0.2387* -0.3423* -0.0337 -0.1736* -0.0966 0.1780* -0.0985 -0.3725* -0.3165* -0.3229* -0.0031 1 
            
ulc -0.0792 -0.2020* -0.1446 -0.1362 -0.1568 0.0356 0.0259 -0.2403* -0.1186 -0.0497 0.1029 0.0573 1 
           
rdgdp 0.025 0.2999* -0.1001 0.1599* 0.1313 0.2204* 0.3519* 0.3189* -0.0759 0.0961 0.0455 -0.0381 -0.0855 1 
          
invprof 0.1188 0.0832 0.0249 0.1824* 0.1852* -0.1 0.3637* -0.0006 -0.0618 0.1549* 0.0348 0.0003 0.2404* 0.1132 1 
         
burqua 0.2460* 0.3322* 0.2562* 0.3809* 0.2679* 0.1026 0.4955* 0.3760* 0.137 0.4982* 0.0435 -0.0894 -0.0107 0.4680* 0.2608* 1 
        
corruption 0.1121 0.1502 -0.0019 0.1795* 0.1198 0.2605* 0.0596 0.2239* 0.1810* 0.3299* 0.0658 -0.0433 -0.1463 0.133 -0.5342* 0.3406* 1 
       
gov_stab -0.1740* -0.2076* -0.2024* -0.1065 -0.0316 0.0131 0.2239* -0.2672* -0.2709* 0.0261 -0.0383 0.0767 0.0094 0.1318 0.5310* 0.0219 -0.2264* 1 
      
lao 0.0895 0.1857* 0.0622 0.1398 0.0234 0.0153 0.1572* 0.2644* 0.1149 0.1004 -0.1143 -0.0971 -0.2170* 0.3180* -0.4482* 0.3461* 0.4550* -0.2028* 1 
     
masales 0.5837* 0.5285* 0.3972* 0.5104* 0.5362* -0.2703* 0.2627* 0.5082* 0.4862* 0.1867* -0.0132 -0.1354 -0.0544 0.0645 0.0613 0.1176 0.0354 -0.1491 0.0126 1 
    
gdppcppp 0.3981* 0.5759* 0.1794* 0.4137* 0.3723* 0.074 0.5217* 0.4907* 0.0762 0.3341* 0.1868* -0.1602* -0.0445 0.6754* 0.3809* 0.5125* -0.0006 0.107 0.0586 0.2561* 1 
   
tradegdp -0.0471 -0.0741 -0.0069 0.0327 0.0482 -0.0053 0.2191* -0.1357 -0.4969* -0.1158 0.2767* 0.1781* 0.1704* 0.2076* 0.3996* 0.3469* -0.0507 0.1566* -0.2240* -0.049 0.4496* 1 
  
taxtrade -0.2393* -0.4172* 0.0825 -0.2976* -0.1079 0.0489 -0.1496 -0.4276* -0.2936* -0.1707* 0.0041 0.1618* 0.2077* -0.2004* 0.2905* -0.1022 -0.3959* 0.3407* -0.3636* -0.1660* -0.1618* 0.114 1 
 
soccon 0.0475 0.1855* 0.024 0.1331 0.0812 0.3277* 0.3258* 0.1117 -0.0056 0.1980* 0.1795* 0.1547 0.1838* 0.3621* 0.2556* 0.4715* 0.0557 -0.1231 0.0791 0.0403 0.5006* 0.3388* -0.0974 1 
* Significant at 5% 
 
